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The present crisis started in United States, the main motor of the present systemic crisis, as a financial 
failure. It spread rapidly in the economic area and also world wide. No economy was spared, and the 
emerging economies, among them Romania, were visible affected, even with a little later. Romania, facing 
a strong economic growth in the last decade, was confronted from Q4 of 2008 with an important slow 
down of the economy and financial disturbances, even almost all economists were hardly accepted the 
contagion effect on Romanian economy. But the current crisis could be not only a cyclical event, but even 
the crisis of the liberal economic framework. 
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1. Macroeconomic Development in Romanian Economy after 2000  
The significant stabilisation of the macroeconomic environment achieved in recent years was 
stimulated by the prospect of becoming an EU member. Romanian GDP increased by a real 7.9% 
yoy in 2006 and 6% yoy in 2007. Economic growth was strong after 2000, and especially in the 
latest 3 years. As we see in the next table, GDP and GDP per capita were strongly growing, the 
inflation  rate  and  unemployment  rate  slowed  down  constantly.  However,  the  foreign  trade 
balance, the external debt and the budget deficit were increasing. Widening external imbalances 
in the context of a general repricing of risk at the international level are, however, enhancing 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 1. Economic developments in Romania, 2000-2007 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
GDP, yoy, %   2,1  5,7  5,1  5,2  8,5  4,4  7,9  6 
GDP per capita (lei)   3583  5211  6950  8758  11018  13327  15962  18791 
Exchange rate (lei/EUR)   2  2,6  3,1  3,8  4  3,6  3,5  3,3 
Inflation rate (%)   45,7  34,5  22,5  15,3  11,9  9,0  6,6  4,9 
Unemployment rate (%)   10,5  8,8  8,4  7,4  6,3  5,9  5,2  4,1 
Foreign  trade  balance 
(thou EUR)  
-1876  -3323  -2753  -3956  -5324  -7806  -
11759 
-
17586 
External debt (thou EUR)   11163  13575  14969  15885  18298  24641  28628  36728 
Budget  Excess/Deficit 
(thou lei)  
-3204  -3758  -3808  -4395  -3693  -2268  -5100  -9449 
Source: INSSE 
 
Economic growth was strong also in 2008, but the significant growth was reported in the first 3 
quarters. Compared to other European economies, it appears the strongest growth (see Table 2). 
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Table 2. Growth of the GDP 2008/2007, % 
   Q4   Year  
ROMANIA   2,9  7,1 
EU (27)   -1,4  0,9 
Belgium   -0,8  1,2 
Germany   -1,6  1,3 
Estonia   -9,7  -3,6 
Spain   -0,8  1,2 
France   -1,0  0,8 
Italy   -3,0  -1,0 
Latonia   -10,3  -4,6 
Lithuania   -2,0  3,1 
Hungary   -2,3  0,5 
Netherlands  -0,6  2,0 
Austria  0,3  1,8 
Poland   2,3  5,4 
Sweden   -4,9  -0,2 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
Although, in Q4, economic growth slowed down, as in all other European economies, emerging 
economies  included.  In  2008,  the  GDP  achieved  during  Q4  was  31,6%  of  the  yearly  GDP, 
compared to the period 2000-2007 when it was of 32-33% (see Chart 1).  
 
 
 
Chart 1. GDP development in 2001-2008, yoy 
Source: INSSE 
 
Despite  this,  construction  and  communication  remain  among  the  sectors  with  the  best 
contribution to the economic growth recorded. Unfortunately, the biggest contributions are of 
sectors very pro-cyclical and a priori fluctuating: constructions and services, while industry has a 
very small contribution. .  
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Chart 2. Contribution to GDP growth, by category of resources, 2008/2007 
Source: INSSE 
 
FDI continued to play a major role in shaping the future specialisation of the country. Foreign 
companies already represent 43% of total turnover and 72% of the total exports of Romania. The 
incoming FDI increased significantly, to 9000 million euros in 2008 (preliminary data).  
 
2. The signs of the crisis 
Romanian economy benefited from a favorable premise, e.g. the absence, to the local plan, of the 
toxic "financial instruments" of derived types, pertaining to the "sub prime" credits. However, as 
the  credit  crisis  extended  and  the  global  financial  crisis  spread,  the  confidence  between  the 
financial institutions got lost, and the banks hesitate to grant credits whose repayment is not 
certain. The result was a financial blockage propagated in waves towards the Romanian financial 
institutions. A lot of them saw themselves obligated to stop the credit lines to the enterprises, 
with immediate effects on the production and investment expenses.  
So, as world wide, and as occurred in the Great Depression, the current crisis began with a 
financial crisis. However, and unfortunately, the actual crisis is not only a financial one; it spread 
into the real economy. Moreover, it is not a liquidity crisis; it is a crisis of the velocity of the 
liquidity, intensified by the lack of confidence – a priceless public good.  
As stated by the Recent Larosière Report, the current crisis has many causes: macroeconomic 
issues, risk management issues, Credit Rating Agencies failure, corporate governance failures, 
regulatory,  supervisory  and  crisis  management  failures  –  excessive  de-regulation.    “Ample 
liquidity and low interest rates have been the major underlying factor behind the present crisis, 
but financial innovation amplified and accelerated the consequences of excess liquidity and rapid 
credit  expansion.  Strong  macro-economic  growth  since  the  midnineties  gave  an  illusion  that 
permanent and sustainable high levels of growth were not only possible, but likely. This was a 
period of benign macroeconomic conditions, low rates of inflation and low interest rates. Credit 
volume grew rapidly and, as consumer inflation remained low, central banks - particularly in the 
US - felt no need tighten monetary policy. Rather than in the prices of goods and services, excess 239 
 
liquidity showed up in rapidly rising asset prices. These monetary policies fed into growing 
imbalances in global financial and commodity markets”
99.  
Although  the  global  crisis  was  already  obvious  in  the  developed  economies,  Romanian 
economists and especially politicians were very optimistic about the possibility that the crisis 
extend  itself  in  Romania.  This  is  due  to  very  strong  economic  growth  and  the  absence  of 
integration with the world financial system. However, in an economy where almost 90% of the 
bank system belongs to foreign banks, the risk of contamination was very high. Indeed, the crisis 
occurred and its first signals were obvious in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
In the real economy, the first clear signs of slowing were noticed in Q4. Despite the strong 
economic  growth  of  near 9%  yoy  in  the  first  3  quarters  of  2008,  this  growth  proved  to  be 
unsustainable, based mostly on consumption by credit of import goods. Indeed, GDP growth rate 
slowed down to 2.9% in Q4, proving the Romania’s vulnerability and exposure to the global 
financial crisis. 
Inflation rate recorded a 9% peak in inflation in July 2008, but disinflation started to gain pace in 
H2/2008. The disinflation process is expected to go on in 2009, on the background of economic 
crisis (see Chart 3).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 3. Consumption prices index, 2002-2008 - previous year = 100 - 
Source: INSSE 
 
Unemployment rate increased from 5.4% in Q3 of 2008 to 5.8% in Q4, and the occupancy rate 
went down from 60.5% in Q3 2008 to 58.3% in Q4 2008.  
The current account deficit is a significant threat to the macro-economic stability, and financing 
the gap a concern, even in Q4 imports strongly contracted (export growth remained negative). 
This correction allowed  the full year 2008 current account deficit to reach “only” widen 5% on 
2007 to reach 12.7% of GDP, down from its peak of 13.7% of 2007 (see Chart 4).  
   
                                                       
99  High  level  group  on  financial  supervision  -  de  Larosière  Group  report, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/pdf/statement_20090225_en.pdf , p. 7 
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Chart 4. Exports (FOB), imports (CIF) and FOB/CIF deficit, January 2008-January 2009 
Source: INSSE 
 
The  RON  depreciation,  beyond  the  uncertainty,  exerted  a  positive  effect  on  the  C/A  deficit 
correction. Thus, the exchange rate depreciated as follows: December 2007: 3.53 RON/EUR, 
December 2008: 3.92 RON/EUR, March 2009: 4.2 – 4.3 RON/EUR. The import prices raised 
and  thus  stopped  the  import-oriented  consumption  (-17%  yoy  drop  in  November  2008).  As 
coverage the external financing needs was a major source of concern, the recent IMF agreement 
is meant to respond to this threat.  
The monetary issues are even more complicated. RNB initiated a tightening cycle in November 
2007 and raised its key policy rate, several times, from 7% to 10.25% in July 2008, trying to slow 
down the rate of lending and to limit the risk of overheating the economy, and also imposed 
several  restrictions  on  the  maximum  level  of  household  debt.  As  a  reaction  to  the  fast 
deterioration of the growth prospects, NBR turned its policy stance around in the early 2009, 
initiating its first cautious cut.  
In this crisis of the real economy, the exporters are the more touched, because the demand and 
the financings of the European Union and United States, the main business partners of Romania, 
began to cut down at the same time with the extension of the crisis. The main factor that affected 
the business environment in Romania is the decreased demand, phenomenon related to:  
  the availability of the credit  
  the volatility of the exchange rate  
  the apparition of the late payments and the problems of liquidity  
  the availability of the credit: 
  the uncertainty on the rate of exchange 
  the financial blockages: difficulties to cash the production sold. 
The crisis touches selectively the economy. The most affected are the companies in metallurgy, 
metallic constructions, metal products, and the industry of the transportation means, construction 
supplies, chemical industry and transportation
100.   
 
3. Government responses  
The  government  response  to  the  crisis  concerned  in  the  first  place  two  issues.  First,  on 
institutional level, it was created inter-ministerial groups for implementing anti-crisis measures 
taken by the government, as well as re-enforcement of the National Committee for Financial 
Stability. Second, on strategic level, it was adopted a program to offset the crisis, structured in 
more than 20 economic, financial and social policy actions. The most important component is the 
public investment in infrastructure and transportation.  
                                                       
100 *** Raportul anual de analiză şi prognoză, SAR, 2009 
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Another response, the agreement with IMF is meant to respond to the issue of financing the 
major C/A deficit. A stand-by agreement for two years with the IMF for 12,95 billions euro, part 
of a multilateral financial support packet, was signed in March 2009. The total packet of external 
financing (IMF, EU, World Bank, EBRD) is 19.95 billions euro, as follows:  
  -IMF: 12.95 billions euro, interest rate of 3.5% per year, sliced until 2010, repayment 
until   2015  
  -EU: 5 billions euro  
  -World Bank: 1 billion euro  
  -EBRD and other financial institutions: 1 billion euro  
The main goal is to improve the consequences of the strong fall of the incoming private capital in 
Romania  and  to  implement  the  necessary  economic  policies  in  order  to  reduce  the  fiscal 
unbalances and to strengthen the financial system  
The mission of the IMF agreed with the Rumanian Government a budgetary deficit of 4.6% of 
the GDP in 2009, under the condition of maintaining the present wage level and that all extra-
revenues to be used exclusively for investments.  
 
4. Conclusion. Is the current crisis the most powerful one after the Great Depression? 
In the present context, there are a lot of similarities with those that followed the stock crash of 
1929,  such  as:  a  period  characterized  by  an  excessive  indebtedness  followed  by  a  massive 
deflation of the prices of assets, an analogous stagnation within the banking and financial system; 
an economic slowing that is quickly and spectacularly propagated to the whole world. 
There  also  bug  and  important  differencies.  The  unemployment  rate  exploded  in  the  Great 
Depression to 24%, while now is above 10%. In 1929-1933 the bank system recorded hundreds 
of bankruptcies, it was not settled a system to deposit guarantees, the monetary policy was to 
reduce the money supply, and the world wide response was to enhance protectionism that drove 
to an increase of the customs tariffs. Nowadays, the government measures reduced significantly 
the risk of bank failures (but the price will be paid by the next generations!), it was pursued a 
massive recapitalisation of banks, and there are searched emergency saving policies to help the 
banking systems. 
Even though the extension and seriousness of the crisis are not yet known, it is obvious the need 
to  re-build  the  financial  markets  operating  pattern,  in  the  sense  of  more  or  at  least  better 
regulations. The economic growth, if not sustainable, will all the time result in more or less 
severe corrections. There is also needed a budgetary re-launchement globally co-ordinated. On a 
more extensive level, this crisis marks the end of an American-style capitalism and probably the 
crisis of the neo-liberal model. A new-etatism is ready to emerge, a new keynesism and perhaps a 
new global order. 
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